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Abstract
This paper presents a model of delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists operating in a
linear city with two types of consumers and having incomplete information. At each
location, the higher cost firm offers a uniform price equal to its delivered marginal cost
while the lower cost firm offers a nonlinear tariff. For nearby locations, the lower cost firm
may charge monopoly nonlinear prices, but as the distance increases the quantity consumed
by the low valuation consumer becomes less inefficient than under monopoly. In the market
region closest to the competitor’s market we get an efficient outcome. If firms choose
locations, before choosing tariff schedules, they will locate at the median of their
equilibrium sales distribution.  2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a model where competing firms produce a good which is
physically identical but spatially differentiated and where firms deliver the good.
At each location, consumers may be of two types, high and low valuation, and
firms have incomplete information about their types. We analyze how the
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